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Abstract
In Finland, community water supply has increasingly relied on natural groundwater and artificially recharged groundwater as the
raw water source. Several managed aquifer recharge (MAR) projects have been co-created with involved parties and have
proceeded well, while some cases have raised considerable resistance among the stakeholders. It seems that success or failure
in MAR cooperation is related to management cultures and the ways in which various interests are taken into account, from the
very beginning and throughout the process. Empirically, this paper builds on comparison between two conflictual case studies in
Finland: one in the Tampere region and the other in the Turku region. The study analyses the major constraints of these projects
through the lens of collaborative rationality, also drawing upon discourse analysis and negotiation theory. The material is
gathered through thematic interviews of stakeholders, newspaper articles and a stakeholder workshop. The results indicate that
conventional management approaches, drawing from expert-based instrumental rationality, were insufficient in both cases. The
collaborative rationality framework suggests that legitimacy for the groundwater projects should be gained through joint knowl-
edge production and inclusive multiparty interaction for creating options for collaboration. Both cases lacked the tools and know-
how for authentic dialogue and collaboration. The emerging paradigm emphasizes more collaborative approaches for natural
resources management and urban planning.WhileMAR projects operate inside these areas and are highly complex in nature, it is
essential to embrace the emerging paradigm in order to promote MAR systems along with their huge potential.
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Introduction
While the circulation of water in the natural and built environ-
ment is reasonably understandable and can be easily explained
through maps, diagrams, and tables, the pathways of human
affairs are rather difficult to grasp. Indeed, community water
systems, including managed aquifer recharge (MAR), can be
classified as complex in nature. These systems involve inter-
actions between natural, built and social environments, as well
as several networks and stakeholders, which are often com-
peting for a limited and common resource (Islam and
Susskind 2013). In addition, actors operate at various levels
(local, regional, national and international) and within various
development sectors (e.g. agriculture, energy, industry,
communication, etc.; Biswas 2004; Ringler et al. 2013).
In their European MAR inventory, Sprenger et al. (2017)
identified 224 active MAR sites in 23 countries. Large quan-
tities of drinking water are produced by MAR systems in
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland. Besides, MAR has the
future potential for reuse and storage of water resources, using
nature-based systems. In their attempt to quantify the use of
MAR at the global scale, Dillon et al. (2019) point out that
MAR is an increasingly important water management strate-









1 Finnish Environment Institute SYKE, Latokartanonkaari 11,
FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland
2 Tampere University|, Tampere, Finland
3 University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10040-021-02334-y
/ Published online: 6 April 2021
Hydrogeology Journal (2021) 29:1369–1378
enhancing and securing groundwater systems and for
protecting and improving water quality. In Finland, the focus
country in this paper, the first modern MAR systems were
constructed in the 1970s and by 2016 there were altogether
26 MAR systems in operation (Katko 2016). These systems
use mostly basin recharge, but also sprinkling irrigation, well
injection, and, in a few cases, bank filtration.
Traditionally, the management of modern water systems
has emphasized technological and engineering aspects, while
not necessarily acknowledging the complexity of the systems
and importance of governance experimentation (Bos and
Brown 2012). In environmental research, it is common to
assume that physical and ecological features of the problem
can be separated from their social context (Budds 2009).
These features do not exist, however, in a vacuum; therefore,
the conventional engineering approach is not applicable to
complex problems such as water management schemes that
involve several unpredictable, unknowable, and uncontrolla-
ble interactions. Water management problems find their way
beyond the roles of water professionals only, increasingly re-
quiring an interdisciplinary approach (Freeman 2000), posing
challenges to redefine the profession of water managers.
Indeed, while talking about MAR as a response to the
global water crisis, this fundamental matter should be
acknowledged—for example, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD 2011) states that the
current water crisis is not about water scarcity but about mis-
management, with strong public governance features (see also
Carius et al. 2004; Rogers et al. 2006; Saleth and Dinar 2004).
Indeed, several international organizations (Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO, International
Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH), World Bank (WB)
and the Global Environment Facility (GEF)) have addressed
the groundwater issues through the governance framework.
Groundwater governance can be seen as a complex and
over-arching framework of water policies—searching the
ways by which strategies are executed and how actors from
various fields interact (Groundwater Governance 2016).
Dillon et al. (2019) noted that “in recent years, research into
governance, operating practices, reliability, economics, risk
assessment and public acceptance of MAR has been
undertaken”.
As a hidden and often overexploited resource, groundwater
forms a fruitful arena for debates and conflicts (Jarvis 2014)
especially in terms of land use and spatial planning
(Cuadrado-Quesada 2014; Salazar et al. 2007; Giordano
et al. 2013), social development and equity (Kemper 2003;
Linton and Budds 2014) and jurisdictional controversies
(Mumme 1982; Zeitoun 2007). Groundwater conflicts and
governance have evoked research especially concerning arid
and semiarid countries; therefore, it is interesting to analyse
the case of Finland, where somewhat water-abundant condi-
tions have not prevented groundwater conflicts. This context
introduces an interesting perspective to the discussion about
water issues being related to a problem of governance rather
than water scarcity.
The purpose of this article is to report new perspectives for
groundwater governance by analysing two contentious cases
of MAR in Finland. The paper is based on the doctoral dis-
sertation published by the first author (Kurki 2016, the last
name is changed to Laukka). The study analysed the major
constraints of these projects and reflected on them within the
larger context of collaborative rationality framework (Innes
and Booher 2016), and finally outlined the lessons for future
collaboration. The major research questions are—how collab-
orative were the processes in the case studies and how were
the preconditions for collaboration identified and addressed?
Research methodology, materials
and methods
Twentieth century’s policy literature and practice has follow-
ed the logic of instrumental rationality which assumes that,
through logical steps, experts can gather appropriate data, an-
alyse it objectively, and find the best alternatives to bring to
the tables of decision-makers (Islam and Susskind 2013; Innes
and Booher 2018). However, the complex world does not
follow the logic of a linear model of the universe, and a shift
from vertical and hierarchical government to network-like and
horizontal governance has emerged (Ansell and Gash 2018;
Bodin 2017;Michels andMeijer 2008; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007;
Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). Consequently, new forms of
collaborative planning and governance have emerged since
the 1980s, building on developments in interorganizational
and cross-sectoral public administration (Bryson et al. 2006;
Ansell and Gash 2018), and environmental conflict resolution
and consensus-seeking negotiation (Susskind et al. 1999a, b,
Innes 2004). These approaches seek to tackle complex prob-
lems through process designs with horizontal multiparty inter-
action imbued with a new type of process orientation and
mindset, named by planning scholars Judith Innes and
David Booher (Innes and Booher 2016) as “collaborative ra-
tionality”. According to those authors, collaborative rational-
ity, as opposed to instrumental rationality, considers a full
range of views and reaches conclusions through shared mean-
ing about their context and the information relevant for the
problem. It involves something of a “we are all part of the
problem and the resolution” way of thinking. Therefore, a
process based on collaborative rationality is inclusive and in-
volves mutual learning and joint reasoning (Innes and Booher
2016).
Building on the notion of collaborative rationality, the con-
ditions, as evaluative criteria for a framework of analysis, are
outlined (Table 1). This research analyses two case studies,
two inter-municipal MAR projects, both of which may be
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classified as groundwater conflicts. While the assessment is
performed through this framework, discourse- and conflict
analysis are used as analysing methods.
In order to lay out the context for the collaborative ratio-
nality analysis, characteristics of conflict in the MAR cases
were studied using methods of discourse analysis and conflict
analysis. Discourse analysis is used to understand how differ-
ent stakeholders perceive reality and how they participate in
the construction and framings of the aims and issues present in
MAR projects. It analyses stakeholder perceptions and actions
in and through text and talk (Nikander 2008). This research
employed two concepts; storyline and discourse coalition, in-
troduced in Hajer’s (1995) discursive framework; and further
complemented with the idea of knowledge coalition intro-
duced by van Buuren and Edelenbos (2004).
The concept of storyline can be described as a generative
narrative which simplifies a phenomenon in order to construct
a comprehensible picture of it. Storylines are like discursive
cement that keeps a discourse coalition together, while the
coalition participates in maintaining and transforming the
storyline (Hajer 1995). The formation of coalitions is an even-
tuality in multi party processes and especially policy coali-
tions may or may not share discourses. Since knowledge pro-
duction is an important part of coalition-building, the idea of
knowledge coalitions was used in order to complement the
analysis of discourse coalition. The idea contributes to the
discussion of the transgression of science and society
(Delvaux and Shoenaers 2012; Jasanoff and Martello 2004;
Nowotny et al. 2001), and moves the focus from between the
policy and knowledge worlds themselves to between the coa-
litions that may include actors from both worlds: for example,
citizens, authorities, private sector, and policy-makers (van
Buuren and Edelenbos 2004).
While this study utilizes discourse analysis to explore the
way different parties see the phenomenon, conflict analysis is
used to describe the conflict, central issues and interests of
each party. Here the negotiation theory is used in order to
analyse the stakeholder interactions. These analyses also bind
into the collaborative rationality framework.
Negotiation theory involves two main models of negotia-
tion: distributive and integrative bargaining (Walton and
McKersie 1965). The previous includes a strong emphasis
on positions, through which parties define their goals and
generally engage themselves in a zero-sum negotiation. The
main purpose is to defend one’s own goals with as minor
concessions as possible and to maximize the share of the fixed
amount of benefit (Bartos 1995; Fisher et al. 1991). Strong
positions overshadow the parties’ interests and they are locked
in narrow-minded thinking, thus not acknowledging creative
new solutions which could satisfy the underlying interests.
Whereas distributive bargaining concentrates on the visible
tip of the iceberg, the integrative negotiation approach (also
known as principled or interest-based negotiation) emphasizes
the underlying interests which can be seen as the 90% of an
iceberg that lies below the surface. According to Fisher et al.
(1991) and Susskind et al. (1999a) the goals and positions hide
the parties’ true interests, the underlying reasons that explain
why they take the positions they do. If these interests are
revealed, alternative solutions and benefits for all parties can
be searched for; thus, this value creation process requires a
shift from positional thinking to interest-based negotiation
(Islam and Susskind 2013).
Table 1 Collaborative rationality framework developed from the work of Innes and Booher (2016)
Condition Explanation
1. Inclusion and diversity of the participants and
authentic dialogue
All points of view on the issues are included in the process. Legitimization cannot be reached if
inconvenient opponents are left out from the process. Every participant has an equal right to
speak, to be listened to and to have access to the knowledge on the issues. Skillful management
is needed to assure focus, mutual comprehension and legitimacy of participants’ claims. In the
end, conclusions need to be reached and agreements made with shared understanding
2. Emphasis on interests; use of interest-based nego-
tiation (integrative bargaining)
Participants are encouraged to introduce their interests in the issue and discouraged from
position-taking. Once they have gained a broader picture of the situation and they understand
the others’ interests as well, they will have a chance to consider new possibilities
3. Joint knowledge production Expert knowledge as well as community knowledge are both part of the dialogue. Discrepancies
and differences among various knowledge sources are worked through. This may produce
more accurate information than a single study would, but will also legitimize the gained
knowledge, which is crucial to reaching agreements and advancing into taking action
4. Acceptance of creative ideas. Everything is on the
table, enabling creativity.
Impossible or inappropriate ideas are also acknowledged, which may help break a stalemate or at
least generate out-of-the-box thinking and lead to new and unpredictable solutions. This allows
parties to cooperate in ways that enlarge the pie for all
5. Satisfying significant concerns of each member The substantial concerns of each participant are not only acknowledged, but the group works
through the issues together in order to find ways to satisfy them. Majority rule is not
appropriate as it creates winners and losers.Winners are happy, but losers are likely to sabotage
the next steps of the process
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The two cases were studied in parallel by using an over-
lapping approach: the observations from one case study were
compared with the observations from the other during the
whole research process. The case studies involved multiple
materials, including newspaper articles (approx. 400 articles),
stakeholder interviews (n = 45), and material gathered from a
workshop. Newspaper articles were used as material for the
discourse analysis and stakeholder interviews for the conflict
analysis. Interviewees were chosen by using a snowball sam-
pling method (Hirsjärvi and Hurme 2011)—key informants
were interviewed, and they suggested further interviewees
who again suggested more and so on. Altogether, interviews
included representatives from all the major stakeholder
groups: environmental and municipal authorities, decision-
makers, representatives of a water company, land-owners,
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and other active citizens.
Based on the interviews, official documents and court de-
cisions, a conflict map was outlined: the case timeline, in-
volved parties, main issues and events of the project.
Subsequently, the conflict map was complemented in a work-
shop, inviting a representative from each stakeholder group.
The conflict map was presented and revised together in the
workshop and the representatives also had an opportunity to
comment on it before and after the workshop. All the material
gained from the interviews and the workshop was analysed
using the categories of conflict assessment: history, parties,
interests, context, and process dynamics (Peltonen and
Kangasoja 2009).
Results
The results of the study are summarized as follows. The first
section outlines the basic characteristics of the two cases.
While the second section introduces the patterns of the conflict
and conditions for collaboration, the third section presents
possibilities for future groundwater governance.
What happened in the study cases?
Natural groundwater and artificially recharged groundwater
are commonly used as a raw water source in Finland.
Although artificial recharge was tried in Vaasa (western coast)
in the late 1920s, wider use of artificial recharge did not start
until 1970. In historical perspective, the selection of raw water
between ground and surface sources has been an everlasting
issue of debate in the country (Katko 2016). Currently, the
combined share of the natural groundwater and artificially
recharged groundwater supplied is some 66%, out of which
16% is artificially recharged and 50% is natural groundwater.
Finland is part of the boreal region having rather abundant
water resources. The major groundwater resources, including
contributions via MAR, which is mainly used as a water treat-
ment method (Kolehmainen 2008), are located in inland es-
kers and ice-marginal delta formations (Hatva 1996). The ma-
jor part of the population is, however, situated in coastal areas;
thus, large city centers are often obliged to withdraw ground-
water from afar. While crossing municipal borders, tensions
between jurisdictional units may occur.
In addition, MAR projects have evoked contradictions re-
lated to spatial planning. MAR processes have indirect im-
pacts on land use due to possible restrictions for other land
use activities such as gravel mining, plant nursery, or agricul-
ture. Furthermore, MAR processes involve physical land use
requirements for different recharge methods such as recharge
basins, sprinkling, and recharge wells.
The two cases can be shortly described as follows. The first
case is situated in the southwestern coastal Turku Region (lat-
er referred as case TRW), and the second in the inland
Tampere Region (case Tavase, Fig. 1). They are often referred
to as sister-projects—in both cases the growing urban area
needs to secure its raw water supply in terms of quality and
quantity. Good quality groundwater can be found from the
rural area although not in sufficient quantity. The problem
could be solved with MAR techniques, although the rural area
in question does have adequate groundwater resources for the
needs of the local community without using MAR. Thus, the
local community does not necessarily have motivation for
cooperation, which is a key problem in collective action. In
both cases, opposition emerged in the rural areas and led to
long litigation processes.
Case TRW started in the 1970s. Turku Region Water
company (TRW Ltd) was established in order to withdraw
raw water from Lake Pyhäjärvi; however, due to strong
opposition the project was voted down in 1993 when new
plans were directed towards the MAR project in the same
rural region. The opposition continued but after several
phases the project got the permission from the Supreme
Administrative Court in 2008 and the MAR plant started
to operate in 2010.
Case Tavase started in 1993, as the municipalities pub-
lished the General Plan for water acquisition. In consensus
they decided to establish an MAR project, which would be
implemented on an esker situated in the rural areas of the
region, and managed by a water company called Tavase Ltd.
The MAR plant would be constructed on the top of the esker
situated in two municipalities, Pälkäne and Kangasala.
In this case the opposition emerged gradually, starting from
Pälkäne the only municipality that did not have, nor need, any
shares in the project. The opposition was a surprise to the
project planners, who were not prepared to respond to these
changes in social orders. After years of litigation, the project
got a negative decision from the licensing authority in
June 2015. However, in 2018, a decision came from the
Supreme Court of Administration to continue the permit
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process with the submitted plans in Kangasala municipality.
This comprises 70% of the planned drinking water produc-
tion. According to the decision, a change of plan is needed for
the operations in Pälkäne municipality: it should be ensured
that there will be no risks regarding the wellbeing of a nature
conservation area. In 2020, the Regional State Administrative
Agency gave an additional permission for water production
with somewhat limited capacity in Pälkäne municipality. The
permit process continues and further decisions are expected in
2021.
The two case studies were selected since they are the larg-
est MAR projects in Finland and they both represent, in the
Finnish context, a rather large groundwater conflict, thus
forming a fruitful ground for the conflict analysis. In addition,
while being sister-projects, they do have interesting differ-
ences as well. First, case TRW operates in water-scarce con-
ditions (by Finnish standards), and the case Tavase region is
water abundant. Second, according to geographical position-
ing, only case TRWmay be regarded as a long-distance water
transfer project, as it is managed and implemented in two
separate areas. In case TRW, the municipalities where the
MAR plant is situated are not shareholders of the water com-
pany, whereas with Tavase Ltd. the municipality of Kangasala
is one of its shareholders.
Patterns of conflict and conditions for collaboration
The discourse analysis of the two cases revealed various
storylines related to the projects; however, two of them were
interpreted as the most relevant ones: local economy and en-
vironmental change storylines, which could both be clearly
distinguished in both cases. The latter was chosen because
of its’ most frequent appearance in the case materials, and
the previous because of its’ latent relevance. The opponents
were afraid that the MAR project would threaten the local
economy, e.g. in terms of tighter restrictions concerning other
land use activities (such as plant nursery and gravel mining).
However, the other storyline was much stronger and support-
ed the hegemonic environmental discourse: the local residents
in both cases saw theMAR project as an environmental threat,
whereas the project planners saw it as an environmentally
friendly solution to water management problem. There was a
clear contradiction between the two discourses. The latent
local economy discourse indicates economic competition be-
tween jurisdictions as well as tensions between rural and ur-
ban areas which should be acknowledged in project planning.
It also displays a tension between competitive and collabora-
tive tendencies between municipalities. However, the policy
decisions were mostly colored by the environmental change
Fig. 1 Geographical locations of the two case studies: Turku Region (case TRW) and Tampere Region (case Tavase) including the numbers of
inhabitants of the municipalities (Kurki 2016)
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storyline, especially those aiming at the opposition of the
projects.
Despite this positioning, the fault lines of conflict were not
formed between experts and lay people. Instead, in both cases,
the project opponents included highly educated actors, and
they utilized expert-based factual arguments to support their
cause. Local residents aligned with expert arguments,
favouring research results and outside expertise overclaims
relying on local, everyday grounds. They also joined forces
with individual groundwater experts who gave their personal
support to the opponents. Thus, the formed discourse coali-
tions can also be called knowledge coalitions (van Buuren and
Edelenbos 2004) which move the focus from between the
policy and knowledge worlds themselves, to between the co-
alitions that include actors from both worlds.
In these settings, the preconditions of collaboration for
MAR projects are not straightforward to begin with, and they
may be further compromised by shortcomings of process de-
sign andmanagement. Local opposition can be the result of, or
at least fueled by, top-down processes and exclusion of legit-
imate actors and concerns. An analysis of collaborative ratio-
nality, using the framework described in the preceding, points
to shortcomings in addressing the conflictual tendencies with
better, more collaborative approaches.
First, the diversity of the participants was recognized by the
project planners and all the stakeholders were invited to brief-
ings. However, the project planners lacked the management
skills for establishing and sustaining an authentic dialogue
where mutual comprehension and legitimization of the pro-
cess could be reached. Instead of being heard and acknowl-
edged, the participants felt that their concerns were neglected.
Furthermore, knowledge on various issues was distributed
rather openly, but limited access to data, to however small
extent, left the opponents distrustful, suspecting that the pro-
ject planners were hiding something; thereafter, the spiral of
distrust deepened.
Second, as opposed to collaborative rationality, the parties
adopted a mental model of distributive bargaining and the
emphasis was not on exploring interests but, rather, on claims
and preestablished positions. The focus in the interactions
between parties remained, in a metaphorical sense, on the tip
of the iceberg, the visible part of the conflict, while the under-
lying interests, the fundamental part, were hardly explored to
find common ground. Accordingly, in both cases, the envi-
ronmental argumentation acted as the main discursive cement
inside the opposing coalitions and it overshadowed the latent
local economy discourse, which revealed some profound con-
cerns and interests of the local residents. Whereas protecting
groundwater and the environment was of particular relevance
to local actors, the local economy formed one of the main
concerns related to the MAR projects. At this point, the plan-
ners’ professional skills, which leaned on instrumental ratio-
nality, did not support a more comprehensive analysis of the
case and did acknowledge the interests of the opponents.
Instead of acknowledging the interests of the other side and
considering new possible ways of thinking, the parties pur-
sued their own goals with a competitive mindset. The project
planners were locked into their own positions defined by the
water company, and the opposing coalitions, with no access to
negotiate with the managers, could not see any other way out
than trying to stop the whole project.
Third, the knowledge production process mainly empha-
sized the highly technical forms of expert knowledge.
Community knowledge remained absent from the dialogue,
while also the opponents used expert-based argumentation.
The discrepancies and differences among various knowledge
sources were never worked on together—instead, knowledge
coalitions were formed between the opponents and project
planners, and neither of them approved the arguments present-
ed by the experts from the other coalition. The situation ended
up in a deadlock where the expert-based arguments did not
calm down the opposition; instead, it became even stronger.
This research, therefore clearly supports the argument present-
ed, for example, by Nelkin (1979), Pellizzoni (2003), and van
Buuren (2009): increasing the amount of expert knowledge
does not necessarily solve the problem. Indeed, the controver-
sy provided a vivid example of what is referred to as the
problem of ‘dueling experts’ in the literature on science-
based controversies and remedies such as joint fact-finding
(Matsuura and Schenk 2017).
Fourth, the mental model of distributive bargaining and the
competitive atmosphere also hindered the possibility of put-
ting everything on the table. Little room for creative problem-
solving remained where interests were not openly explored in
the first place. The ideas of the other party were neglected and
denied because of the fear that any concession to one party
would stand for less benefits for the other, revealing an obvi-
ous tendency towards a zero-sum game. For example, the
opponents did not only oppose the project, but they sought
to present alternative ideas and calculations, which were total-
ly ignored by the project planners. Thus, shared out-of-the-
box thinking did not occur, and there was no possibility to
create new innovative solutions together.
Fifth, satisfying significant concerns of each member could
not be reached either. For example, the local residents feared
economic losses and environmental impacts that the MAR
projects would cause to their municipality, and in both cases,
project planners tried to indicate some benefits that local res-
idents would gain from the project and to offer compensation
if some unintended effects would occur. However, the com-
pensations were not acknowledged in this competitive atmo-
sphere and mutual trust was already lost: the opponents
claimed that these concessions were false or inadequate.
There was no place for alternative or creative solutions, which
would satisfy the underlying interests of both parties. The
distributive bargaining model easily ends up in a deadlock
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or only creates winners and losers; thus, it often destroys re-
lationships and fosters mistrust and hostility (Nolon et al.
2013). Satisfying concerns of each member does not mean,
however, that everyone wins (it would be unrealistic); instead,
the aim is to enter into an agreement that meets the parties’
interests better than if they could not reach an agreement at all
(Islam and Susskind 2013).
All the five conditions of the collaborative rationality pre-
sented previously were analysed through both cases and the
cases were remarkably similar in respect of interaction,
knowledge production and argumentation. Thus, the major
differences are related to their geographical positioning and
the structure of the organization. Regarding case TRW, the
opposition was strong and concentrated to the rural area,
which is not part of the water company; whereas regarding
case Tavase, the gradually emerging opposing coalition
formed around three municipalities of which two are share-
holders of Tavase Ltd. The latter perhaps gives the opponents
a stronger position, and it remains to be seen whether the
project will be completed or not.
Finally, the analysis reported here, of collaborative ratio-
nality in the twoMAR cases, boils down to a demonstration of
the continued dominance of a technical, instrumental rational-
ity in the Finnish water sector, with an emphasis mainly on
rational expert knowledge, leaving little room for adequately
acknowledging concerns in the local socio-economic environ-
ment. In the case studies, project planning and management
was not able to recognize the complexity of the problem and,
thus, the need for collaborative planning. Therefore, the pro-
jects were managed predominantly from a technical perspec-
tive, while the influence of social orders to water management
was underestimated. The planning approaches, based on in-
strumental rationality, could not successfully operate in the
field of complex water management. One of the observations
related to the assumption held by many planners—that water
management infrastructure, especially a MAR plant, is an en-
vironmentally benign service for a local community, and thus
welcome—did not hold, and, unable to change course, this led
the projects into further acceptability challenges. It is notewor-
thy that supposedly ‘nonpolluting’ facilities such as wind
power plants have experienced similar opposition in recent
decades. However, in some other Finnish MAR cases, not
explored in this study, the local socio-economic environment
was better acknowledged and no opposition occurred. This is
worth further research.
What could have been done otherwise?
Analysing the challenges that the twoMAR projects faced can
offer some lessons for future complex groundwater projects.
In this section, these lessons are presented and complemented
with literature on collaborative rationality.
Whereas the goal of groundwater management based on
instrumental rationality is to achieve outcomes that fulfill
technical, legislative, and environmental requirements, more
collaborative approaches lay greater emphasis on the accep-
tance and legitimation process. In that process, two major
aspects need to be considered—interaction and knowledge
production. As the two case studies illustrated, the diversity
of the participants might be acknowledged but there are no
tools or know-how for authentic dialogue, and thus failed
interaction is one of the fundamental constraints for complex
groundwater projects and can form an insurmountable barrier
between parties. However, if the interaction is successful it
can form a bridge even between contentious interests of
various parties. According to Innes and Booher (2016) and
the collaborative rationality framework, in a collaborative pro-
cess, acknowledging the concerns of the other side and clari-
fying the interests of each party would help them to see out-
side the box (see also Fisher et al. 1991). Thus, parties would
start to realize that instead of having a fixed amount of bene-
fits, they have several other options, and it is worth investigat-
ing those options before committing to particular solutions.
The integrative negotiation model is used in order to produce
an agreement between the parties.
Conflictual planning processes show that disagreement on
the facts prevails also among the experts themselves. In the
case studies, also the opponents invoked authorities who were
considered to be experts in the field. This was possible, since,
among the experts, MARwas not unambiguously approved as
the best water management solution to the areas in question. In
the absence of absolute truths and related authority, neither the
opponents nor the project planners consider the knowledge
produced by the other party as reliable. Instead of duels of
experts, this observation should lead to improved deliberation
between experts; thus, in the pursuit of collaborative rational-
ity, the main task is to create legitimate and socially robust
knowledge jointly with experts and stakeholders (see also:
Matsuura and Schenk 2017; Seijger et al. 2016; Islam and
Susskind 2013; Ehrmann and Stinson 1999). In this joint
knowledge production process, expertise is exploited as a fun-
damental source of knowledge but it is complemented with
local, experiential, and other forms of nonscientific knowl-
edge. The most important question is to find legitimate ways
to gather this knowledge base, which then forms a cornerstone
for the collectively produced truth about the problem.
In these settings, the role of a water manager should be
redefined. Instead of being the holder of the only legitimate
source of knowledge, she or he needs to adopt a more facili-
tative stance, suited to horizontal, collaborative work relations
having the key to expert-based knowledge, but could also act
as a conveyor, who constructs and maintains the collaborative
process and ensures that every relevant stakeholder is at the
negotiation table (Innes and Booher 2016). In complex
groundwater conflicts, professional facilitators or mediators
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can be contracted to secure trust in the planning process. Here
it is important that a mediator has some familiarity with the
technical issues and understanding of the substance (Jarvis
2014).With increasing complexity, building a mediation team
with complementary skills and expertise may be helpful.
Water managers should embrace the idea that in order to reach
durable and feasible outcomes in processes, instead of just
allowing stakeholders to participate, one really needs them
to participate and contribute. Also, participation does not just
happen: it needs to be skillfully organized and requires a new,
collaboratively rational mindset—the stakeholders should be
viewed as partners or allies who are an invaluable asset for
dealing with current groundwater management problems that
are inherently complex in nature.
Conclusions
This research analysed two MAR conflicts using the frame-
work of collaborative rationality. Together with discourse and
conflict analysis and negotiation theory this led to a compre-
hensive analysis of the metaphorical iceberg: visible dis-
courses, hidden interests, and the main constraints were re-
vealed. These cases demonstrated the challenges in the con-
ventional way of thinking and management of groundwater,
based more on instrumental than collaborative rationality.
Tools and practices derived from the conventional manage-
ment proved inadequate in governing complex MAR issues.
Conventional groundwater management in Finland has not,
as of yet, embraced participatory methods, not to mention more
advanced approaches and the so-called negotiation dimension
(van den van den Hove 2006), which is key in developing gen-
uine and properly designed collaborative planning processes.
Rather, the field is largely driven by an assumption of perfect
and objective information that can be obtained by expert analysis.
However, in complex cases this assumption leads to a deadlock
as strong reliance on expert knowledge imposes hierarchical
power relations and competition over who is right instead of
acknowledging diverse interests and knowledge bases. When
facing complexity and conflict, overly rigid expert culture be-
comes part of the problem instead of the solution.
Evidently, transforming water management practice by
implementing collaborative tools includes several practical chal-
lenges. To begin with, it remains challenging to persuade every
party to negotiate, especially in the situation that has already
escalated or been blocked, as it was in both cases here. While a
continued stalemate may serve to create enough frustration to
drive efforts to break the impasse (Susskind and Cruikshank
1987), conflicts are often met with conflict avoidance, leading
to losses of time and money when projects are abandoned. In the
absence of a meaningful analysis of the stakeholders, tensions
and local concerns, MAR projects and project managers do not
have adequate tools to understand the risks and potential costs of
conflict (Franks et al. 2014; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). A
clear understanding of the situation, provided by conflict or situ-
ation assessments would help managers and stakeholders alike
(Susskind et al. 1999b).
Without proper analysis of the possibilities of negotiated
agreements, the parties may falsely assume that they are
already winning the case and it would be even harmful to start
negotiations; they may use the power of not collaborating
(Margerum 2002; Margerum and Robinson 2016). Going
forward, the emphasis should be further transferred from
conflict resolution to collaborative governance where
anticipatory work is an essential part (Susskind et al. 2012;
Margerum 2011; Innes 2004). Early engagement is often
emphasized as necessary in order to achieve durable outcomes
(e.g. Cuadrado-Quesada 2014; Nolon et al. 2013; Reed et al.
2006; Chess and Purcell 1999).
Furthermore, many water professionals as well as authorities
may avoid collaborative approaches because of their complexity.
A collaborative process is likely to be more complex with mul-
tiple parties involved than the conventional linear process. In
addition, some professionals may fear the loss of authority in
informal problem-solving, whereas elected officials may view
the consensus-based process as giving up power (Islam and
Susskind 2013). The conventional way of thinking is rooted deep
in practices and structures of the water management sector as
well as in the education of water professionals, thus setting the
standard of acting for multiple parties (Innes and Booher 2018).
These standards may be difficult to break in individual cases,
unless a larger paradigm shift occurs.
The need for more holistic approaches in scientific
inquiries and in practice has been acknowledged for decades
(Innes and Booher 2018). Conflicts can be seen as anomalies
that challenge the prevailing paradigm. Since current ways of
thinking and practices of operation no longer provide
satisfactory results, both problems and the tools for problem
solving need to be redefined. Accordingly, conflicts around
the two MAR projects can be seen as challenges to the expert
system and prevailing planning paradigm. It seems that the
world of water planning and management is balancing
between two paradigms—instrumental and collaborative
rationality.
The new paradigm can be seen as an addition to the
coexisting theoretical sources and practices from the old par-
adigm (Bäcklund andMäntysalo 2010). Accordingly, the new
paradigm neither discards the old one totally nor offers direct
solutions to old problems. Rather, the new collaborative par-
adigm provides new ways of configuring existing elements
such as technical expertise, and assigns them new roles in a
restructured process. For example, constructing a water pipe-
line network to a new residential area within a single local
government jurisdiction is not as complex nor as unpredict-
able a management problem as is an inter-municipal MAR
project, involving multiple, interdependent yet autonomous
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actors. Thus, its construction would not require a large-scale
collaborative planning and implementation process.
Therefore, it is crucial to identify the level of complexity of
the problem and analyse the problem thoroughly. This would
help in choosing proper management tools and approaches for
the planning process. This implies a need for better diagnos-
tics of water management situations and appropriate procedur-
al responses.
Accordingly, the collaborative turn in groundwater gover-
nance would introduce processes that reflexively rely on the
precepts of collaborative rationality while assigning a new
role for expert-based planning not as master but as servant
of collaborative work. For example, expert-based knowledge
production would continue to serve as a crucial part of the
joint knowledge production process in order to answer the
question of what is being processed. Instead of pregiven cat-
egories of what type of knowledge counts as relevant, collab-
orative knowledge production would seek to secure the best
possible knowledge base with diverse inputs from a range of
experts and stakeholders.
The contextual framework of this study lies in the larger
context of urban planning as well as natural resources man-
agement (NRM), and the findings echo the earlier research on
collaborative governance in these fields. Findings from the
specific context of groundwater management and MAR, and
the Finnish geographical context in boreal regions, demon-
strate the need for exchange of experiences between different
sectoral, geographical and governance contexts. As the results
indicate, context needs to be considered in every analysing
process, but the reoccurring characteristics of conflict manifest
themselves regardless of contexts. It is hoped that this research
contributes to a shared effort of understanding and addressing
current challenges in water management, and highlights the
need for opening up new methods and paradigms in the face
of conflict and complexity.
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